Obama's Muddled Nuke Strategy

One year into his presidency, Obama still lacks a clear strategy for halting Iran's nuclear weapons program.

President Obama’s policies on nuclear disarmament and Iran suffer from a dangerous flaw: they are not clear. As former CIA director Michael Hayden notes, “deterrence only works with clarity.  If anyone has doubts you cannot deter them.” The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the ambiguous results of this week’s nuclear summit raise doubts that the administration is interested in an effective deterrence.

Modernizing nuclear weapons would not only keep our deterrence credible, it would allow for reducing the arsenal. Unfortunately, the NPR is “ambivalent” about modernization according to CIA specialist, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen: “On the one hand, the administration rejects nuclear weapon development… on the other hand, the administration recognizes the need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Continual refurbishment of our existing stockpile is necessary in this regard.”

The administration’s commitment to reducing the nuclear arsenal is puzzlingly advertised as part of a way to get Iran not to invest in weapons technology. One high-ranking official describes this as an “if we reduce our arsenal then everyone will reduce theirs” strategy. This may be logical, but would only hold true if Iran behaved rationally – an opinion not held by Director Hayden, “The Iranian government’s decision making process has always been a mystery.  How do you deter a state that may not act as a rational actor?”

The administration is pushing for sanctions to convince Iran to stop its nuclear ambitions, but can they realistically be implemented? General Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under George W. Bush, is skeptical: “for sanctions to work… we’ll have to see if the rest of the world will come on board with us.”  He cited that China has other priorities like ensuring their energy supplies and that Russia may not participate because Iran is an important buyer of Russian technology and weapons.

Even if Iran suspended its program, that would not guarantee security. Director Hayden explained that Iran can stop short of having a nuclear weapon but be in “a permanent breakout state… able to create a weapon in a relatively short time.” Another former CIA official noted that the IAEA can only verify compliance at declared sites. How will the administration deal with the threat of unknown locations?

One issue that historically has had bipartisan support in the U.S. is a robust missile defense yet the new U.S.-Russian nuclear agreement appears to limit it for America, a troubling thought for the allies under our nuclear umbrella.  General Myers commented, “for a long time the Russians have been trying to impose limits. We have to be alert to the Russians pushing us on this.”

Some have argued that the real threat is nuclear terrorism and not nuclear war between states, therefore, concerns about how Russia or China perceive our nuclear strength are less relevant. General Myers explained why the capabilities and intent of other nations should not be ignored: “with Russia and China we know what their capability is but we don’t know their intent.  Capabilities can change very slowly over time but intent can change with a flip of the switch.”

Obama could strengthen America’s nuclear deterrent by taking the necessary steps to modernize the arsenal and seriously tackle the obstructions that Iran will make to defend its weapons program. At the moment, evidence that the administration is clearly aware of these hurdles is desperately needed and unfortunately lacking.