Will Hamid Karzai be Assassinated Next?

More than anything else, the assassination of Ahmed Wali Karzai is probably and indication of what the future holds for Afghanistan.

Never mind that he was President Hamid Karzai’s half-brother. The fact that he was killed by a close and trusted associate – one of those whom Karzai depended for security – indicates that the Taliban are like body lice: easy to attract, damn hard to get rid of.

Karzai was reputed to be the most corrupt man in Afghanistan. That’s nonsense, of course, in a country that specializes in what we in the West may view as corruption, but in that part of the world is considered a necessity for surviving.

It seems that as well is playing hanky-panky with warlords and benefitting from the drug trade, Karzai was also on the payroll of the CIA – if not right now, certainly in the past.

That, too, is par for the course.

As allied soldiers start pulling out of Afghanistan, or cutting back, it’s almost a given that assassinations and intimidation will increase.

The Taliban have been quick – even eager – to acknowledge responsibility for killing Karzai, the survivor of many past attempts.

That the assassin was a trusted confidante of Karzai is ominous. Inevitably, one wonders how many other key figures in the administration are Taliban plants, waiting for the right moment to eliminate enemies?

It’s a given that when allied soldiers leave – and the ones cutting back are the ones who’ve done most of the fighting and provided security for the country (the U.S., Britain, Canada, Netherlands, Denmark) – that the Taliban will become bolder and more ruthless.

Hopes are that the Afghan National Army (ANA) will be sufficiently trained to be able to keep the Taliban in check. The trouble is, hope and reality rarely coincide.

No argument that Afghanis are fighters – but not so hot as soldiers.

Soldiering today requires some literacy and mathematics. If you can’t count – and many Afghanis can’t – and don’t know numbers, how can you direct artillery fire, or coordinate military manouevres?

Counting, for some Afghanis, consists of “one, two, and many.” That makes map references an elusive mystery. So the training of the ANA has been tedious and complex. Willingness to “fight” is the least of problems.

Fears are that when the allied soldiers leave or are reduced, it’ll be increasingly difficult for air workers in villages. The Taliban will do what they can to discourage locals from depending on foreign aid workers. It only takes a few assassinations to intimidate a whole region.

And if aid workers are killed – perhaps the most convenient targets – other aid workers will likely be pulled out.

There are no valuable natural resources in Afghanistan that are deemed essential for exploitation. So a return to the warlord culture with little outside interference is inevitable. Maybe warlords can cope with the resurgence of the Taliban?

Regardless, the signs for the country are not encouraging.

More assassinations are likely as western interest is destined to fade as western soldiers leave the country.

And to say “corruption” has quelled our interest in the country is something of a cop-out. There is no excuse for not knowing that what we view as corruption is endemic in that part of the world.

It’s always been that way – and will continue to be . . . until Afghanis themselves change their ways.

Until then, will President Hamid Karzai be next?