Why America Won't Repeat Russia's Afghan Defeat

This week, Mikhail Gorbachev warned that victory in Afghanistan is "impossible". U.S. forces though have been careful not to repeat the Soviets' mistakes.

Remember Mikhail Gorbachev, the former leader of the Soviet Union? No? Well, you’re not alone. Most people no longer remember Gorbachev, a long-forgotten -- and deservedly-forgotten -- relic of the Cold War.

Gorbachev is famous for presiding over the collapse of the Soviet empire and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Of course, Gorbachev didn’t want to see his empire collapse. His hand was forced, however, by an economically and militarily resurgent United States (thank you Ronald Reagan), and by the complete and utter failure of communism as a political and economic system.

Nevertheless, the Western media has long had a love affair with Mikhail Gorbachev, to whom it attributes uncanny wisdom and foresight, which the man simply does not possess and, in fact, never possessed. And the Western media is at again, publishing a series of articles that publicize Gorbachev’s doubts about the American war effort in Afghanistan.

“The former leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, has warned NATO that victory in Afghanistan is impossible,” reports the BBC. “Mr. Gorbachev said that the U.S. had no alternative but to withdraw its forces if it wanted to avoid another Vietnam.

'Victory is impossible in Afghanistan. Obama is right to pull the troops out. No matter how difficult it will be,' Mr Gorbachev said in an interview with the BBC's Moscow correspondent Steve Rosenberg.

Excuse me, but who cares what Mikhail Gorbachev thinks about Afghanistan? The man was a decent-enough bureaucrat, I suppose; however, he is hardly a military expert.

In fact, the Soviet military experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s is a case study on what not to do there. The Russians launched a conventional, heavy- and ham-handed military invasion and were wholly unprepared for the exigencies and necessity of counterinsurgency warfare.

Indeed, according to George Washington University’s National Security Archive:

The Soviet Army also quickly realized the inadequacy of its preparation and planning for the mission in Afghanistan.

The initial mission—to guard cities and installations—was soon expanded to combat, and kept growing over time. The Soviet reservists, who comprised the majority of the troops initially sent in, were pulled into full-scale combat operations against the rebels, while the regular Afghan army was often unreliable because of the desertions and lack of discipline.

The Soviet troops had absolutely no anti-guerrilla training. While the formal mission of the troops was to protect the civilians from the anti-government forces, in reality, Soviet soldiers often found themselves fighting against the civilians they intended to protect, which sometimes led to indiscriminate killing of local people.

Operations to pursue and capture rebel formations were often unsuccessful and had to be repeated several times in the same area because the rebels retreated to the mountains and returned to their home villages as soon as the Soviet forces returned to their garrisons. Soviet traditional weaponry and military equipment, especially armored cars and tanks were extremely vulnerable on Afghani terrain…

The U.S. military, by contrast, may well be the greatest counterinsurgency force in the history of warfare. American Soldiers and Marines, after all, have been engaged in this type of fight since 2001; and the hard and difficult lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have been well learned and internalized -- at least by the U.S. military. (Our politicians and journalists, unfortunately, are an altogether different story.)

Thus Gen. Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency Guidance (1 Aug. 2010) “for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan” specifies two dozen command directives, including.

1. Secure and serve the population. The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center of gravity. Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF [International Security Afghan Forces] prevail.

2. Live among the people. We can’t commute to the fight. Position joint bases and combat outposts as close to those we’re seeking to secure as is feasible. Decide on locations with input from our partners and after consultation with local citizens and informed by intelligence and security assessments.

4. Help Afghans build accountable governance. Afghanistan has a long history of representative self-government at all levels, from the village shura to the government in Kabul. Help the government and the people revive those traditions and help them develop checks and balances to prevent abuses.

5. Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Together with our Afghan partners, get our teeth into the insurgents and don’t let them go. When the extremists fight, make them pay. Seek out and eliminate those who threaten the population. Don’t let them intimidate the innocent. Target the whole network, not just individuals.

6. Fight hard and fight with discipline. Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the firepower needed to win a fight. We can’t win without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture our way to victory.

Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate. That’s exactly what the Taliban want. Don’t fall into their trap. We must continue our efforts to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.

12. Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out. Earn the people’s trust, talk to them, ask them questions, and learn about their lives. Inquire about social dynamics, frictions, local histories, and grievances.

Hear what they say. Be aware of others in the room and how their presence may affect the answers you get. Cross-check information and make sure you have the full story. Avoid knee-jerk responses based on first impressions. Don’t be a pawn in someone else’s game. Spend time, listen, consult, and drink lots of tea.

“The Americans come visit us and have tea with us,” one [Afghan] village elder told National Public Radio back in June 2008. “The Russians never dared stay here for more than 15 minutes … any longer and the mujahedeen would start attacking them.”

In short, it is simply ludicrous to compare today’s supremely well-disciplined and well-prepared U.S. military with the backward and half-drunk 1980s-era Soviet Army. (I know it’s impolitic to be this blunt, but that happens to be true.) Gorbachev may not know better, but the Western media certainly should. Shame on them.

John Guardiano blogs at strong>www.ResoluteCon.Com<, and you can follow him on Twitter: strong>@JohnRGuardiano<.