What Went Wrong in Iraq - The Definitive Account, Part 4
This is part four of a series. Read part one here, part two here, and part three here.
The Iraq war was supposed to pay for itself, as the Gulf War had done a dozen years before. Instead, since 2003, Iraq has become the largest single-nation recipient of US international assistance in history.
Almost all of Iraq’s external debt – estimated at up to $130 billion – has been forgiven. The US alone has provided more than $50 billion in aid, and other countries have contributed generously as well. This money has achieved some good ends: Iraq’s currency has been stabilized and many projects have been commenced. But much of this money has been wasted or lost.
Much of the middle section of Hard Lessons details in sorrowful detail the contracts gone bad and the chronic costs of insecurity.
On pp 158-160, the report delivers a final assessment of the first year of Iraq’s post-Saddam history:
The CPA, which the UN had recognized in UNSCR 1483 as an “occupation authority,” had several missions assigned to it by the U.S. government and the international community, including: the administration of Iraq; the reform of the country’s bureaucratic, security, and economic institutions; the repair of Iraq’s infrastructure; and the establishment of a democratic foundation for a constitutional government that would represent all of the country’s people. Each of these missions required a mammoth effort; tackling them all simultaneously, as the CPA had sought to do, called for a level of operational synchronization that was simply beyond the CPA’s capacity.
When the CPA came into being, it did not have the staff or resources to lead a comprehensive rebuilding program in Iraq. The Defense Department, which was given the lead over postwar Iraq by NSPD 24, had failed to provide the CPA with sufficient numbers of qualified staff and an integrated overarching plan that articulated achievable objectives for the rebuilding of Iraq.
Operating in a crisis environment, the CPA had no time to deliberate or develop alternative implementation plans. Ambassador Bremer made quick decisions that responded to changing circumstances on the ground. This process yielded some ill-advised orders that undermined the CPA’s capacity to achieve its very ambitious reconstruction goals…
The CPA helped shape the development of a democratic Iraq, but it never had the organizational capacity to realize many of its goals. It was forced to improvise, creating ad hoc offices … to perform vital reconstruction tasks. These offices filled boxes on ever-expanding organizational charts but remained under-staffed and under-resourced from the CPA’s inception until its end.
In a hastily arranged ceremony, the CPA folded its tent in the Green Zone on June 28, 2004, returning sovereignty to Iraq two days ahead of schedule. As its senior officials departed, the CPA issued a glowing report card on itself titled, “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments. Ambassador Bremer compared the reconstruction of Iraq to the Marshall Plan, and the CPA’s self-assessment ended with a list of achievements purporting to show that the CPA had done more in a shorter period of time in Iraq than the United States had accomplished nearly six decades earlier in postwar Germany. For example, Bremer noted, the CPA had created an independent central bank in two months; Germany did not have one for three years. Iraq became independent after one year; German sovereignty did not come for a decade. The CPA had “trained a new military” in three months; in Germany it took ten years. The CPA put together a reconstruction program in just four months; the Marshall Plan was designed over three years.
The CPA’s self-assessment missed the mark. The Iraq it left behind was in a perilous state…
Iraq had slipped into the grip of a fierce insurgency, more U.S. troops were dying almost every day, and the occupation had soured many Iraqis on the continuing U.S. presence in their country.
MORE TO COME