The Afghan Dead End

The media have paid a lot of attention to the factors that play a role in retarding progress in Afghanistan...Pakistan, corruption, lack of a rule of law, disenfranchisement, decentralized societies, etc. Those factors, while all true, are outside our immediate span of control.

The main issue is the lack of a simple command and control structure. US in the North, NATO (ISAF) in the South, conventional and special operation forces on top of each other, each with their own battlespace commander, each with their own agenda and philosophy on how to accomplish whatever goals they envision compounded with an at best, ambiguous mission profile.

So... 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan... to do what, exactly? Civilian trainers to assist in the further development and fielding of the police force? What does that really mean? More MPRI/Blackwater/Triple Canopy/ place contractor name here ad nauseam to overwatch and mentor the local police and assist in day-to-day operations? Where are they synched? Who has oversight and ensuring a centralized operations and procedural methodology that is sustained throughout the rotation of the trainers? In a valley just an hour away from Bagram Air Base, the police force WAS the Taliban, albeit in government uniforms free to terrorize and extort the population at will. Better yet, why are we sending more trainers when most of the Special Forces Teams, the doctrinal unit specialized in training indigenous forces are without an Afghan force counterpart, i.e. the "Afghan Face" necessary to conduct operations? Bottom line... it is not the amount of troops we have in Afghanistan, it’s how the ones we already have are used. And somebody please, please tell me what a “moderate” Taliban is. This is counter-insurgency, and we are relearning the same painful lessons the Russians did, at our great cost. Try to imagine eradicating an ant-hill with a hammer. There was something to be said for the Vietnam Hamlet project, the inkblot concept. Address the failures of that attempt and apply them to the current one. Only when the tribes and valleys far from Kabul are secure and productive will the legitimacy and recognition of a viable central government be possible.

So... $7 Billion over a five year period to Pakistan. Projects in the FATA and NWF? We're better off handing that money over to the newly retired AIG execs...at least I'm fairly certain some of that money will make it back into our system. Pakistan will take our money, build with whatever is left after their own contracting officer's pockets are padded, and accomplish NOTHING. I'm reminded of the village shura I attended where we agreed to pay for and help construct a school in a certain valley in Afghanistan. Afghani village elders could teach the Beltway lessons in Machiavellian discourse. Tea, smiles, handshakes, praises of American generosity... then utilize the majority of the classrooms as a weapons cache and the newly razed soccer field as a reference point to launch mortar and rocket attacks against American convoys. Will they take the money? Absolutely. Will it develop a sense of gratitude and willingness to find common ground and start anew? Never. What will the metrics of success be for the administration? X amount of roads constructed, schools built, and training conducted... but how do you measure success when the desired end state is a change of ideas and ideals?

Pakistan will do this; Pakistan is with us towards that... the only thing wrong is that there is no Pakistan as westerners have come to understand the definition of a nation state. Whether Republican or Democrat, I don't think anyone would doubt that when the President calls the Joint Chiefs, people hustle. When the Deputy Director of the CIA calls his Station Chief, he pays attention. More importantly, despite the occasional operational disagreements, the agency and DoD both acknowledge and recognize the established chain of command. Orders are given, orders are carried out. The chain of command is followed. Period. In Pakistan, there is no such assumption. There is the current political faction in civilian power, there is the senior military leadership, and there is the intelligence arm, the ISI. Do not think, for one moment, that they act in synergy with one another. Especially in the FATA. The civilian leadership orders the army into the region to stamp out the insurgency that is being fueled fiscally and logistically by the ISI. They ARE the enemy. Politicians want to know the real story? Ditch the generals and colonels in Bagram and head out to a tiny firebase on the Afghan/Pak border called Shkin. Talk directly with the Special Forces captains and sergeants on their day to day interaction with the Pakistan Army... and make it a surprise visit... don't let the traditional senior brass dog and pony show stifle real discussion on real issues. They might not be in perfect uniforms, they might have beards, long and unkempt hair...but they have also been fighting the Pakistan border army routinely. Let me say that again... FIGHTING the Pakistan border guards routinely. How else does one define mortar and artillery attacks on our firebases from Pakistani army observation posts across the border? The Pakistanis will say "Ah...but we left that post last week because the Taliban was so threatening...it must have been the Taliban themselves that fired at you" How convenient. $7 Billion to Pakistan? Are you kidding me? Have we suddenly realized that opium production and sales funds the purchase of weapons and materials out of the great supply store that is the Northwest Frontier? Really?

President Obama just purchased billions of dollars worth of mortgage-backed securities, Pakistan style with a AAA rating of waste.

This is a two colonel war. Reduce the number of battlespace owners, streamline the command and control hierarchy, clearly define the mission and intent, and hold commanders accountable for success or failure against reasonable and quantifiable metrics, and most importantly, ensure continuity during handover between troop rotations.