Silence Won't Save the Super Committee

Hill-focused media report breathlessly that the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (the “super committee”) has clamped down on possibilities of leaks by allowing each of the 12 members to bring one staffer to meetings.

Why? To “prevent leaks,” the staffers say. Given the track record of leaks endangering trust on the part of participants, one can understand the rationale. However, this approach may not make sense in this case - in fact, it may make it harder. Three reasons why:

First, lots of ancillary staff in the House and Senate have been brought into the operation, presenting papers outlining options, helping with scoring, and generally helping manage the chaos.

Second, this isn’t a negotiation between the Executive and Legislative branches, nor even a conference between House and Senate.   This is a Congressional committee that ultimately has to answer to the rest of the Congress.  The notion that the JSC will do its work in a virtual cocoon with little input from other committees, staff and members, is not only naïve, it runs counter to the spirit of the committee's creation.

Finally,  the decision-making process has already been compromised.  JSC members may want to be able to negotiate with as little outside interference as possible, but surely this is already made more difficult by the prospect of Democratic and Republican leadership hovering over the negotiations.  In addition, the envy and uneasiness generated by the secrecy and power of the JSC means that Senators and Congressmen may need their staff to help them navigate this nest of adders.

So, what does this “silence” all mean?

History gives only a little guidance.

In 1983, the proceedings of the “Greenspan Commission” on Social Security were widely followed by the media.  Yet, the real conversation that turned what could have been a fiasco into an excellent policy product was kept as quiet as possible, to the point that only Sens. Pat Moynihan and Bob Dole knew what was actually said. However, fortunately those two had not only the intellectual firepower to produce a solution, but the political power and respect to push through legislation that became law.

In other words, secrecy in that case was a necessary precursor to results.

By contrast, the 1990 “Andrews Air Force Base” negotiations between President George H.W. Bush and Congress resulted in fiscal restraint and rules that helped keep the lid on profligate spending legislation for several years despite leaking like a sieve.  Yet, lack of secrecy in that case did nothing to stop success and productive legislation. After all, the President and Congressional leadership agreed and that was more than enough firepower.

Many other commissions and task forces have tried secrecy.  Some have succeeded and most have failed. This suggests that the critical element in all these matters is not secrecy, it is the power of the negotiators.

Moynihan and Dole had the power to make their recommendations stick.  The Bush Administration and Congressional leadership had the power to recommend and compel new law.

As the Joint Select Committee stands now, its 12 members are more proxies than “deciders.”  The real power resides in the respective leaderships and caucuses.  Secrecy, to the extent it can be maintained in a world of tweets, emails, and other new media, rarely holds the key to success.  The key is power - the power to decide what will be done.  And, on the JSC, the people who hold that power aren’t on the committee, but in rooms in the Capitol.