Should Israel Come Clean on Its Nukes?

As the 1967 border discussions are placed at the media forefront again, Israel must once again consider questions on how best to deter foreign aggression. One issue which has not been raised in the recent discussions is Israel’s opaque handling of its nuclear weapon capabilities. Has choosing not to publicly admit that it has the bomb been a mistake?

In military terms, general deterrence is successful when it prevents state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that could escalate into a crisis or militarized confrontation. Keeping in mind the multiple wars Israel has been involved in, it’s obvious that Israel’s silence on its nuclear deterrence has not proven effective.

Michael Karpin a renowned Israeli investigative journalist argues that the Israeli bomb provides self-confidence for the Israeli people in the face of security challenges. Recent polls conducted on national security issues including the “Vox Populi: Trends in Israeli Public Opinion on National Security” study conducted by the Tel Aviv Institute for National Security Studies indicate that the policy of ambiguity regarding Israel’s nuclear capability, enjoys massive public support; 80% of the respondents supported Israel’s handling of the nuclear issue, while only 19% believe that Israel should go public in order to deter its enemies. Only a mere 1% believes that Israel should give up its nuclear arsenal entirely.

Despite this overwhelming domestic support for Israel’s ambiguous nuclear policy there are clear advantages to bringing the bomb out of the basement. To put Israel’s current problem in frank terms, everybody already knows they possess the bomb. Therefore admitting to its “nuclear policy” would be a mere formality. The implications it would have on the negotiating table however would be substantial.

Deterrence strategies encounter two basic problems. The first is the aggressor’s mindset. To be effective, a deterrent threat has to be believed. One state must believe that the other can deliver the threatened punishment and that under certain circumstances it may do so. The second problem is posed by the actions that a threatened state might take. Confronted with a strong defense, a would-be aggressor may act first to overcome it. Confronted with a powerful deterrent, a would be aggressor may seek to reduce its effect by taking aggressive measures to protect its own population or by striking first to destroy a large part of the adversary’s deterrent force.

Clarity plays an extremely vital role in nuclear deterrence. This fact is exemplified by the 1999 Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region in, which, “open” nuclear deterrence prevented the Kashmir crisis from escalating into a war. But clarity can also play a role in nuclear non-proliferation talks. Observing the rapid and unexpected toppling of the autocratic regimes of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or Hosni Mubarak it should be in Israel’s security interests to move forward and put an end to its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Doing so could open the door to talks on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between Israel, Iran and the Middle East in general.

Israel’s silence about its nuclear program may even have accelerated nuclear development in Iran and convinced many small states that they too could acquire nuclear weapons.  Even Libya tried to get into the nuclear game, although they dropped their program in 2003. By not coming clean on its program, Israel may have created a security vacuum in the Middle East, which has been filled by irrational regimes such as Iran, working to acquire their own nuclear capability. Although Israel’s strategy has succeeded in preventing existential attacks, it has not worked as a deterrent against conventional attacks, nor as a warning to rivals against developing nuclear weapons.

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