Petraeus Sticking With McChrystal's Strategy
General Petraeus’s new guidelines for troops confirm that McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy is still the best plan for victory in Afghanistan.
General Petraeus’s new Counterinsurgency Guidance and Tactical Directive confirm what most knowledgeable and informed observers have long suspected: The problem with the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan is not the ROE themselves, but rather their interpretation and application by subordinate units down the chain of command.
The ROE in Afghanistan have been a source of concern in Afghanistan because many troops there view them as overly restrictive. They fear they are being denied their inherent right to defend themselves.
This concern has caused some conservative pundits – including Byron York, Diana West and Tony Blankley--– to question the propriety and viability of the entire U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. America’s counterinsurgency strategy, these critics allege, may be doomed to fail because it substitutes “social work” for “military force”.
But as Gen. Petraeus observed in his new Tactical Directive:
Our counterinsurgency strategy is achieving progress in the face of tough enemies and a number of other challenges. Concentrating our efforts on protecting the population is having a significant effect. We have increased security in some key areas, and we have reduced the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces.
The Afghan population is, in a number of areas, increasingly supportive of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of coalition forces. We have also seen support for the insurgency decrease in various areas as the number of insurgent-caused civilian casualties has risen dramatically…
We must continue – indeed, redouble – our efforts to reduce the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum [emphasis added].
Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause. If we use excessive force or operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks. We must never forget that the center of gravity in this struggle is the Afghan people; it is they who will ultimately determine the future of Afghanistan...
We must fight with great discipline and tactical patience. We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops. Our forces have been striving to do that, and we will continue to do so.
In other words, Gen. McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy is the right strategy for Afghanistan and it is bearing fruit. Moreover, strict rules of engagement, and tactical patience and discipline, are an integral part of this strategy; and that will not change.
Protecting Afghan civilians from collateral damage is a strategic imperative, says Petraeus. But it is also a “moral imperative” to “protect our men and women in uniform,” as well as the “Afghan security forces with whom [they] are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder…”
Yet, Petraeus does issue a clarification of sorts to McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy and strict ROE:
We must be consistent throughout the force in our application of this directive and our rules of engagement. All commanders must reinforce the right and obligation of self-defense of coalition forces, of our Afghan partners, and of others as authorized by the rules of engagement. We must train our forces to know and understand the rules of engagement and the intent of the tactical directive [emphasis added].
We must give our troopers the confidence to take all necessary actions when it matters most, while understanding the strategic consequences of civilian casualties. Indeed, I expect our troopers to exert their best judgment according to the situation on the ground. Beyond that, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine has my full support as we take the fight to the enemy.
In other words, the problem in Afghanistan is not the ROE. We have the right ROE. The problem is how those ROE are understood and applied at the tactical level.
Thus, according to the International Security Assistance Force Headquarters (ISAF), “the most important change from last year’s [tactical] directive is that it directs subordinate commanders not to further restrict Gen. Petraeus’ guidance without his approval.”
“This point is intended to ensure commanders apply the guidance consistently across the force,” said German Army Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz during an Aug. 8 news conference in Kabul. And this, he added, will help to reduce “the possibility of an overly cautious commander who would hinder the troops’ ability to defend themselves.”
In other words, some “overly cautious” commanders in Afghanistan were imposing additional limits on the use of force above and beyond those limits required of them by the ROE. They were doing this to ensure compliance with the ROE, which is laudable; but in practice, they were unnecessarily hamstringing our troops. Gen. Petraeus’ new directive aims to stop this.
“There is an inherent tension in counterinsurgency operations,” Petraeus told Congress on June 30, “between engaging the enemy and protecting the population… As we have done in numerous after-action reports and through other feedback mechanisms in recent months, we will need to continue to educate our leaders on the implementation of the ROE moving forward.”
Maybe we’ll also need to educate our pundits.
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