Lowering Expectations for a Deal with Iran
There are powerful arguments in favor of a deal with Iran. Deals were made all the time during the Cold War, be it between heads of state, formally, or not, for example between the CIA and the KGB during the informal summits they held regularly during the 80's. Likewise, some deals have been made with Iran. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with dealing with the enemy on some particular points. Deals are even agreed to during wars, and there is no open war with Iran, so why not indeed?
But the ideal of a "grand bargain" and the parallel often made with Nixon's policy towards China, points to something entirely different. Nixon was not just making a deal with Mao, he was concluding an alliance, informal but serious. The alliance with communist China -- when it was really communist, right after the Cultural Revolution and years before anyone in China considered any free-market reforms -- was only possible because there was a common and real enemy. The Soviet army had crossed the Chinese border in 1969, and the Chinese government considered a Soviet full-scale invasion a real possibility. In this context, the alliance with China made a lot of sense.
So it is one thing to consider a "deal" with Iran, it is quite another to speak of a "grand bargain". To start with, there is no common enemy. Iran is not threatened by anyone except the countries that would be effectively threatened themselves if Iran had an operational nuclear arsenal. That could include any of Iran's immediate neighbors. Some though insist that Iran wants nukes in order to protect itself against local threats and that the rhetoric about Israel, the U.S. and infidels in general is empty and purely ideological. That may be so, and it doesn't make the Iranian nuclear program any less problematic, considering the likely consequences in terms of nuclear proliferation.
In any case, if Iran feels threatened by something or someone in their neighborhood, it seems that they have decided to put their trust in their nuclear program rather than some alliance with the West or anyone else. Indeed, they made that quite clear from 1979 on, and there is no obvious indication that they have changed their minds.
There is at least one good reason why there has been no strategic alliance: none of Iran's neighbors is an enemy to the U.S. or the West. Even if the U.S. offered its protection to Iran against, for instance, Pakistan, what would really happen in the case of an Iranian-Pakistani war is less than certain. An American military guarantee can only make sense against a clearly identified common enemy, and there is none.
Apart from a military guarantee, what could be the content of a "grand bargain"? On the Iranian side, it is quite simple: they would stop their nuclear program and maybe cease supporting terrorist groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and various other places. And after all, it is all in their best interest. Indeed, considering Iran's geopolitical situation, the right policy would probably be something like the Shah's.
In reality, giving up these policies would not be a small concession for the Iranian leadership. Maybe that is due to ideological reasons, maybe they need to be aggressive on the world stage in order to stay in power, or maybe they are really irrational from head to toe, but in any case, that is what they have been doing for thirty years: the Islamic Republic's policy has often been disastrous, but they haven't changed course, and they are still here. So their price will be high.
So what can we offer, apart from a military guarantee with no credibility? If the West asks the Iranian government what they would like in exchange for the concessions we want, they will certainly find a lot of answers. Economic sanctions will have to stop, maybe as a precondition to any negotiation (if we ask for a negotiation, why wouldn't they ask for something in exchange?). They will likely put forward some symbolic demands in order to humiliate their interlocutors. They might ask for the release of some terrorists (Ahmadinejad asked for one detained in France in exchange for a French student detained in Iran - Sarkozy refused quite flatly). They will probably ask for something in relation to Israel, or Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia, in other words, they will ask the West to abandon -- at least partially -- an ally or two, which will incidentally make any promise of military protection even more empty, thus making Western negotiators look even less credible. Iran may also ask for a lot of money -- and we will probably happily oblige them -- but that is not a grand bargain, that is paying tribute.
The Western powers can promise not to help Iranian dissidents. But once again, it's hard to see what the Iranian government would exactly gain with such a "grand bargain". First, that is pretty much already the case. Twitter.com has probably done more to help the recent "green movement" than any Western nation. Iranian dissidents abroad have been able to pursue their political goals, but the Iranian government has also been able to murder them from time to time (take, for example, former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar who was shot in France in 1991). Daniel Pipes has several times complained about the lack of any Western help to the Mujahedeen-e Khalq. Maybe they are not the most controllable movement but the fact is that the West is not helping them at all.
Second, we don't know what effect massive Western support to Iran's internal opposition would have. That sort of policy was put into practice in Poland during the 80's and was relatively successful, but the various attempts to use Iraqi domestic opposition during the 90's were a complete failure. It is far from certain that the Iranian government is afraid of Western covert aid to their internal opposition. The reality is that many people in Tehran don't seem to need any pro-Western radio broadcast to remind them to be hostile to the regime or to show it from time to time. They probably need some more support among the security forces and the army, or other powerful institutions, but Western nations cannot do much about that.
Third, if the nuclear program is making the Iranian Islamic regime more popular, as many opponents to a military operation seem to think (which is why a strike would rally most Iranians to the regime), then the Iranian government will not accept abandoning it in exchange for us promising to abstain from actions we are already not doing.
Finally, if the Iranian government is truly afraid of its internal opposition, then they will do their best not to show it (for instance by proposing to abandon their precious nuclear program).
In the end, it is hard to see what the Iranians will accept in exchange for giving up their nuclear program. In short, the West hasn't much to offer that the Iranians might want. Actually, the fact that the West is running out of options makes this one even less realistic. Looking desperate will only increase the cost of negotiations. The Iranian leadership may not be as irrational as they seem, they may very well want the bomb mainly to protect themselves against local threats, but a "realist" policy does not only require the interlocutor to be rational, it also requires that both sides have something to gain.