Is Israel's Peace Treaty with Egypt Finished?
One recurring theme in Egypt's revolt seems to be a popular rejection of the peace treaty with Israel. But can treaty opponents really undo the deal?
The protests in the Middle East appear to be getting complicated. A few days ago, protesters burnt a synagogue in Tunisia, and now anti-Semitic signs are appearing in Cairo. The media has spun a narrative linking the Arab demonstrators with past protest movements. But it’s clear that today’s protesters have different grievances than say Eastern Europeans did in 1989. One recurring theme in the Egyptian revolt seems to be a popular rejection of the peace treaty with Israel.
There doesn't seem to be any rational basis however for this particular grievance. Egypt didn't trade peace for anything. To the contrary, they got back the Sinai, just as if they had won the 1973 war (which they also believe to be true). To any external observer, the peace treaty with Israel should be seen as a victory for Egypt. Many though seem to see it as a humiliation. How can that be? Some probably hate Jews and the West, and for them Israel represents both. Others may see war as a source of glory rather than a disaster, even though most wars recently fought by Egypt have been actual disasters.
So if the treaty-haters got their way, it is quite possible that Egypt would simply denounce the treaty. But such a denunciation would probably remain purely theoretical. What then can Egyptian opponents of the peace treaty actually do?
Not much. The Muslim Brotherhood is not proposing to give the Sinai back to Israel. They probably don't want Israel to take it back by force either, which means they won't attack Israel. In short, they would lose and they know it. They could try to use alternative tactics such as a Lebanon-style rocket war, but the terrain would make it easier for Israel to respond than in South Lebanon. It’s much harder to conceal missiles in a desert. They could decide to help Hamas or other terror groups in Gaza hit Israel, but that probably won't be very effective. Israel can take control of Gaza's southern border, and a hostile government in Cairo would allow them to take more drastic measures than they have previously. Finally, Egypt could try to emulate Iran and start a nuclear military program while promoting anti-Israeli terror groups everywhere they can. But in this scenario, their proximity to Israel would then become a huge disadvantage compared to Iran.
The diplomatic outcome of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover in Cairo might therefore be a simple transition from cold peace to cold war. That would not be good, but not apocalyptic either, though it wouldn't be unwise on the part of Israel to reinforce its Southern defenses.
And what of the "peace process" with the Palestinians? The 1979 treaty's apparent unpopularity in Cairo makes it more difficult to take seriously the universally proclaimed goal of a similar treaty between Israel and the Palestinians. In a way, it may also explain Arafat's attitude at Camp David in July 2000. To some extent, the problem he had may not have been the amount of concessions he needed to accept, but rather the very idea of signing such a document.
If Mubarak is currently losing power over a peace treaty signed more than 30 years ago, the conclusion we have to draw is that peace is war and war is peace. Diplomatic activism forcing sides to meet, talk and sign documents only makes things worse. Keeping closed and heavily defended borders however remains the most effective way to limit the death toll. In a way, the Mubarak government has tried to keep a balance between those two alternatives, as did Jordan (in a relatively different way) from 1967 -- first without, and then after 1994, with a peace treaty. Likewise, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has become similar since Arafat's death. Since the Palestinians, unlike the Egyptians and the Jordanians, would have to make actual concessions in exchange for a peace treaty, it's probably best to keep negotiating ad infinitum. That, also explains the inconsistencies in the recent Wikileaks "Palestine papers" which revealed that Mahmood Abbas was ready to make the very concessions Israel had been asking for even while refusing an offer from Olmert that basically met his demands.
Does all this mean that the 1979 treaty was a waste of time? Probably not. The Sinai peninsula had proved relatively ineffective as a buffer zone from Israel's point of view, Egypt has often cooperated more or less openly on security issues and its pro-Western orientation has been more than welcome a number of times.
And after all, three decades later, the treaty isn’t dead yet.