Is Canada Cooling Towards Its Commitment In Afghanistan?

Although there are two years to go before Canadian combat troops are scheduled to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, there are signs the government is cooling on its commitment to expand funding and improve the military.

In the National Post, military historian Jack Granatstein noted that DND budget projections for 2010 and 2011 show a slight decrease from the current $20,993 billion budget.

Last spring, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Defence Minister Peter MacKay were more gung-ho, promising to raise Canadian regular forces to 75,000 from the present 55,000 effective, and to spend some $30 billion on new aircraft, ships, combat vehicles.

DND’s projected budget in 2030 was $30-$35 billion. Some figure this would represent roughly 2% of Canadian GDP going to Defence – up from the present 1% to 1.5% of GDP.

Granatstein, a military realist, is uneasy that DND’s present $20 billion budget “will likely seem to be ripe for the plucking” when the Treasury Board looks for ways to reduce government spending.

“There is little sympathy for the Canadian Forces in the Privy Council Office,” he says. He’s right. Never has been in that section of government.

Traditionally, 40% of the DND budget goes to personnel, whose projected numbers keep getting downscaled (now down to 66,000 regulars).

Granatstein also notes that the capital equipment program is not aimed at acquiring new fighter aircraft or warships, but in modernizing and upgrading existing long range patrol aircraft, Leopard II tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and such.

Sound familiar? It’s what Canadians have always done - keeping equipment, vehicles, aircraft and ships long past their “use before” date. Our equipment is older than most soldiers.

There’s a fishhook embedded in pulling out of Afghanistan.

Put bluntly, it’s likely every Canadian fighting vehicle isn’t worth bringing home because of the wear and tear of what will be close to nine years in action.

Afghanistan is hard on mechanized vehicles of any sort.

One only has to think back to peacekeeping days when roughly 50% of our Leopard tanks were out of commission and being repaired at any one time. And these were only used for training in pretend war games.

Canadian APCs were originally used by the Americans in the Vietnam war - and discarded as being too vulnerable. In the Balkans we reinforced them with metal siding and sandbags on the floor. Still, their casualty rate soared.

The Ilias was to be a replacement for the jeep – and was essentially useless. At the Canadian base in Kabul there was a graveyard of Ilias’ stacked in rows. Troops recall Canada offered them to the Afghan army, which refused unless they were guaranteed a year’s supply of gasoline.

Citing security reasons, DND won’t reveal the casualty rate in Leopard II tanks in Afghanistan, or the casualty rate in vehicles. The Canadian American Strategic Review (CASR) has assessed incidents where casualties have occurred in roadside bombs, on the assumption if someone is wounded or killed in a blast, the vehicle is likely irreparably damaged.

Up to February, 2008, there were 22 LAV III “incidents,” resulting in 69 wounded/injured and 20 fatalities. Ten incidents with the G-wagon (22 casualties); eight with Bison armoured vehicles (22 casualties); seven involving Nyala armored personnel vehicles (27 casualties); four Coyote incidents (10 casualties); and assorted other explosions and accidents, including three Leopard tanks down. And these are mostly battle casualties - not counting wear-and-tear casualties.

When the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is done, the army may need every vehicle replaced if, indeed, it is to maintain its hard-earned reputation as one of the world’s small but most competent armies.

One hopes Prime Minister Harper is paying attention.