Bush Puts France In A Corner

Written by David Frum on Saturday March 8, 2003

At his press conference Thursday night, President Bush offered his much-anticipated ultimatum ... to France.

The news from the question-and-answer session was Bush's announcement that the United States and Britain would proceed with another Security Council resolution authorizing force despite French warnings of a veto. "No matter what the whip count is, we're calling for a vote. We want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Hussein and the utility of the United Nations Security Council ... It's time for people to show their cards and to let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam."

For France, Bush's decision to proceed is very unwelcome. French diplomats and opinion leaders have been hoping (as one of them told me last week) that the United States would take note of France's opposition and drop the idea of a force resolution. One of the smaller nations at the Security Council could then introduce a substitute resolution urging the Security Council to continue monitoring the situation. The United States and Britain would then launch their war -- France could boast to its Arab friends that it had resisted to the last -- and the illusion that France belongs to the Atlantic Alliance could be sustained.

Some might say that there is something awfully hypocritically about France first lecturing the whole world about the importance of the UN -- and then secretly inviting the United States to bypass the UN to spare the French embarrassment. But if the newspapers were to remark on every instance of French hypocrisy, we'd need to buy vast forests of extra paper.

Instead, let's just note that Bush used his prime-time broadcast to rebuff the French manoeuvre. As he cleverly said in his speech at the American Enterprise Institute in February: "We believe in the Security Council so much that we think its words should mean something."

Now the French face a terrible dilemma. If France refrains from vetoing, the Russians have to decide whether to veto. But Russia will be very reluctant to use its veto without France: If France and Russia veto, then the anti-American press can tell a story about the "whole world" opposing U.S. military action in Iraq. But if it is only Russia against the United States, then the story becomes Cold War II. And the losers of Cold War I are naturally reluctant to start a second round.

Without a French or Russian veto, though, it's not clear that an Anglo-American resolution can really be stopped. If France abstains, will Mexico vote against the United States? Pakistan? Chile? Cameroon? Guinea? It seems unlikely. Which means the resolution could carry and France's big talk would be exposed as bluff. A bad outcome for France.

But what if France does veto? From France's point of view, the consequences of a veto are even more ghastly.

First, the U.S.-French relationship would be shredded. France may well remain an American "friend," as President Bush soothingly promised at his press conference. But few in the U.S. national-security establishment would continue to regard it as an ally.

Second, after such a veto, no American President would ever again return to the Security Council before military action. For most of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Americans dismissed the UN as a basically useless institution. Dwight Eisenhower did not ask it for UN authority before his military actions; neither did John F. Kennedy; ditto Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Neither for that matter did Bill Clinton. The one and only U.S. President of the past 60 years to trouble himself with UN authority for the use of force was George H.W. Bush before the Gulf War of 1991.

The UN's ability to act decisively in 1991 rehabilitated the old talking-shop on the East River in American eyes -- and, incidentally, dramatically increased the value of a permanent seat on the Security Council. If the UN fails to act in 2003, its prestige in the United States will plunge back toward its usual level: approximately zero. And the value of a seat on the Security Council will tumble with it.

Why, after all, do French opinions about Iraq matter more than those of, say, Italy or Brazil? If wealth is the measure of national importance, France ranks behind the State of California; if it's military strength, France barely makes it into the top 10, rather behind Israel. Americans are transfixed by French opinions only because the United States submitted its case to a body where, by an accident of history, the French happen to wield disproportionate power. If France wields that power in a hostile manner, no American president will ever return to that body again.

President Bush's words at his press conference elegantly reminded France of those unspoken facts. The French are attentive listeners: I am sure they understood Bush's meaning. So it's not just Saddam who must decide whether to plunge into a confrontation he knows he will lose -- it is Jacques Chirac as well.