Britain In Basra

Former British Secretary of State for Defense Michael Portillo writes about the British role in Iraq in the current Spectator.

In the wake of the Iraqi army’s freeing of Basra, today the markets and cafés are crowded. At the funfair families enjoy the spring evening under the garish lights of a new Ferris wheel. Two British colonels and I head for the bumper cars. A couple of children cadge a ride with the officers, each kid incongruously sharing the cramped space with a man in uniform and his SA-80 rifle. As we move about the amusement park, Baswaris greet us with smiles and ‘salaam’, their right hand flattened across their chest in a sign of respect. The women wear the hijab, but the young ones sport tight jeans too. They are all friendly and unabashed and their eyes meet ours steadily.

Britain was the occupying power in Basra. So - a triumph to celebrate? Not exactly.

The fact that things are going well today, during Britain’s last months in Iraq, is largely fortuitous. Of course, the British army can take credit for some of the training that has brought the Iraqi forces up to a high standard. Certainly, it is a good thing that the Iraqis themselves have played such a decisive role in improving their country’s security. There is no doubt that British soldiers and officials are now doing a good job advising Iraqi generals and training civil servants.

But none of that quite disguises what happened along the way. The British government was more interested in spin than reality. It made too small a commitment to Iraq and became hooked on promises to withdraw from Basra and to reinforce Afghanistan. While the US surged, we were heading for the exit. We let Baswaris die on our watch. ...

The government had committed too few troops to hold Basra. As levels of violence rose, British forces had to abandon their well-intentioned tactic of patrolling in berets rather than helmets. The troops soon dubbed the army’s soft-sided patrol vehicles ‘coffins’ because they offered no protection against terrorist bombs. ...

Unfortunately, even if many British officers and policy advisers understood at the time the blunders that Rumsfeld was making, our government went along with the plans. The only American decision in which Britain did not acquiesce was the one that the United States got right: the surge in troop numbers announced at the end of 2006. By then the British public was war weary and its government defeatist.