Be Afraid

Anthony Cordesman in the National Interest on what increasingly looks like a Pakistani civil war:

The Pakistani army and government have shown they cannot be trusted to provide honest reporting on any aspect of military operations. They have also never provided a meaningful assessment of threat. Whatever Pakistan’s military may have been, its steady politicization since the rule of “President” Mohammad Zia ul-Haq—from his coup in July 1977 to his death in August 1988—has left it largely an inept flatland army. It has become steadily more focused on internal control, and its finances and use of outside aid have become progressively more suspect. ...

Every Pakistani military action seems to result in ambiguous results or a retreat. Tensions between the Pakistani government and the government of Afghanistan continue to rise. The military still finds it much easier to warn about U.S. interference and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty than to take meaningful and sustained action. U.S. General David McKiernan, NATO’s commander in Afghanistan, has warned that there is still “a level of ISI complicity” in the militant areas of Pakistan and within organizations like the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In practice, the ISI also has ties to a number of purely Pakistani jihadist extremist groups which in turn have their own ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda and to terrorist groups in Europe and India. Pakistan’s tolerance of internal terrorist movements has increasingly forced it to focus on threats from the Indian government and its role in terrorist attacks like the violence in Mumbai.

Separating the military from politics will also be increasingly difficult if Pakistan’s political parties continue to self-destruct along with the quality of its central government. The failures and subsequent implosion of Pervez Musharraf’s regime have been replaced by a weak and divided democratic government. At least to date, it is an open contest as to which of Pakistan’s key political leaders—Asif Ali Zardari (Mr. Ten Percent) or Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif—is more self-seeking, and which of its political factions cares less about the nation’s welfare versus its own power and control over the nation’s income. Pakistan is a living warning that elections are no substitute for effective governance, and that real-world political legitimacy is a function of how well politicians serve the people, not whether politicians are elected.

Adding to the instability, Pakistan’s economic growth has not provided broadly based benefits to its population, and the economy in the FATA and the Baluchi border areas has increasingly become a war economy—the population is steadily more dependent on jihadist and government spending.

Recent estimates by the Economist indicate that real GDP growth will slow from 6 percent in 2007–08 to 1.2 percent in 2008–09. The economy could slip into serious recession or even depression if the global crisis persists, and Pakistan has already had to accept a $7.6 billion emergency financing package from the IMF. This has forced it to place serious restraints on fiscal and monetary policy and to cut its budget and spending—although the Economist may well be far too optimistic in estimating that the budget deficit will be only 6.4 percent of GDP in the fiscal year from July 2008 to June 2009.